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Parkinson’s disease is a common neurodegenerative disorder with both motor symptoms and cognitive deﬁcits such as executive
dysfunction. Over the past 100 years, a growing body of literature has suggested that patients with Parkinson’s disease have
characteristic personality traits such as industriousness, seriousness and inﬂexibility. They have also been described as ‘honest’,
indicating that they have a tendency not to deceive others. However, these personality traits may actually be associated with
dysfunction of speciﬁc brain regions affected by the disease. In the present study, we show that patients with Parkinson’s
disease are indeed ‘honest’, and that this personality trait might be derived from dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex. Using a
novel cognitive task, we conﬁrmed that patients with Parkinson’s disease (n=32) had difﬁculty making deceptive responses
relative to healthy controls (n=20). Also, using resting-state
18F-ﬂuorodeoxyglucose PET, we showed that this difﬁculty was
signiﬁcantly correlated with prefrontal hypometabolism. Our results are the ﬁrst to demonstrate that the ostensible honesty
found in patients with Parkinson’s disease has a neurobiological basis, and they provide direct neuropsychological evidence of
the brain mechanisms crucial for human deceptive behaviour.
Keywords: Parkinson’s disease; prefrontal cortex; neuropsychology; PET; executive function
Abbreviations: ADAS=Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale; FDG=
18F-ﬂuorodeoxyglucose; MMSE=Mini-Mental State
Examination; OSEM=ordered subset expectation maximization; WMS-R=Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised
Introduction
Parkinson’s disease, or paralysis agitans, was ﬁrst described
in 1817 by James Parkinson as ‘shaking palsy’ (Parkinson, 1817).
It is a neurodegenerative disease characterized by clinical
symptoms that include bradykinesia, rigidity, resting tremor and
postural instability. In addition, it has been acknowledged that
Parkinson’s disease patients have impairments in cognitive func-
tions (e.g. frontal executive dysfunction), which have a profound
impact on quality of life for some of them (Pillon et al., 2001).
Certain personality traits have long been noted as being
characteristic of Parkinson’s disease patients. In 1913, Carl
Camp wrote ‘It would seem that paralysis agitans affected
mostly those persons whose lives had been devoted to hard
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who never come under the inhibiting inﬂuences of tobacco or
alcohol are the kind that are most frequently affected. In this
respect, the disease may be almost regarded as a badge of
respectable endeavor’ (Camp, 1913). Since the publication of
Camp’s report, many researchers have investigated the association
of Parkinson’s disease with personality or behavioural traits, and
have consistently shown that Parkinson’s disease patients have
characteristic personality traits such as industriousness, seriousness
and inﬂexibility (Ishihara and Brayne, 2006).
Parkinson’s disease patients have also been described as ‘honest’
(Menza, 2000), in the sense that they tend not to tell lies. Although
the possibility that honest people are particularly vulnerable to this
disease cannot be ruled out, insidious neuropathological changes in
the course of the illness might underlie this speciﬁc trait. In relation
to this idea, a previous study reported that the personality change in
Parkinson’s disease patients was primarily the result of the disease
rather than aging (Mendelsohn et al., 1995), and some researchers
have suggested the possibility that the personality traits are asso-
ciated with Parkinson’s disease-speciﬁc brain damage (Menza,
2000; Ishihara and Brayne, 2006). However, it may not be the
case that Parkinson’s disease patients choose not to tell lies, but
rather that they actually have difﬁculty lying due to cognitive
deﬁcits resulting from pathological changes in certain brain regions.
One potentially critical contender for the role of mediator in
complex cognitive processes such as deception is the prefrontal
cortex, a structure known to support executive function. In partic-
ular, it is widely assumed that the lateral (especially dorsolateral)
prefrontal cortex supports cognitive processes requiring executive
function such as response inhibition and cognitive control
(Mesulam, 2000; Anderson and Tranel, 2002). Some clinical stu-
dies have already implicated the prefrontal cortex as being respon-
sible for executive dysfunction in Parkinson’s disease patients
(Carbon and Marie, 2003; Zgaljardic et al., 2003; Owen, 2004).
Impairment in the prefrontal executive system can prevent people
exhibiting ﬂexible and goal-directed behaviours, which are
regarded as essential features of human deceptive behaviour. In
support of the clinical ﬁndings mentioned above, recent neuroima-
ging studies involving healthy individuals have provided substantial
evidence that the prefrontal cortex is consistently active during
the making of deceptive responses relative to honest responses
(Spence et al., 2001; Langleben et al., 2002, 2005; Lee et al.,
2002, 2005; Ganis et al., 2003; Kozel et al., 2004a, b, 2005,
2009; Davatzikos et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005; Phan et al.,
2005; Abe et al., 2006; Mohamed et al., 2006; Abe et al., 2007,
2008; Gamer et al., 2007; Browndyke et al., 2008; Hakun et al.,
2008; Lissek et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2008; Bhatt et al., 2009;
Ganis et al., in press; Hakun et al., in press; Kozel et al., in press;
Lee et al., 2009; Monteleone et al., in press).
The available evidence allows us to hypothesize that Parkinson’s
disease patients have difﬁculty making deceptive responses due to
dysfunction of the prefrontal executive system, and that this is the
reason why they seem to be relatively honest compared with
healthy individuals. To test our hypothesis, we developed a
novel cognitive task for measuring the ability of Parkinson’s
disease patients to give deceptive responses, and assessed the
correlation between their ability to tell a lie and their resting
brain metabolism using PET with
18F-ﬂuorodeoxyglucose (FDG).
Unlike the activation paradigm with normal participants, which
assesses neural response during the actual performance of a task,
resting-state studies of metabolic rate with FDG-PET in brain-
damaged patients can reveal regional dysfunction associated with
their cognitive impairments. Resting-state FDG-PET is considered to
be especially useful in the context of the neuropsychological inves-
tigation of patients with neurodegenerative disease (Desgranges
et al., 2002; Mentis et al., 2002; Eustache et al., 2004; Lozza
et al., 2004; Piolino et al., 2007), because regional metabolic
rate is a marker of integrated local synaptic activity and is sensitive
to both direct neuronal/synaptic damage and secondary functional
disruption at synapses distant from the primary site of pathology
(Magistretti et al., 1999). To our knowledge, the present study is
the ﬁrst to provide direct neuropsychological evidence that the
prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in human deceptive behaviour.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The participants were 32 idiopathic Parkinson’s disease patients
and 20 normal controls matched for age, sex and score on the
Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE). The demographics of the
Parkinson’s disease patients and normal controls are shown in
Table 1. All the patients were recruited from the Tohoku University
Hospital. Normal controls with no history of neurological or psychiatric
disease were recruited from local communities via an advertisement.
The diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease was made by board-certiﬁed neu-
rologists according to the UK Parkinson’s Disease Society Brain Bank
criteria (Gibb and Lees, 1988). The patients’ motor symptoms were
evaluated using Hoehn-Yahr staging (Hoehn and Yahr, 1967) and the
Uniﬁed Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) part III (Fahn and
Elton, 1987). The scores of UPDRS part III were recorded while the
patients were ‘on’ medication. The inclusion criteria for patients in this
study were as follows: age between 50 and 75 years, age at onset
above 40 years, Hoehn-Yahr stage from 1 to 3, and a score of 24 or
higher on the MMSE. The exclusion criteria were: a medical history of
disease of the central nervous system not directly related to
Parkinson’s disease (e.g. stroke, head injury, epilepsy), concurrent psy-
chiatric illness such as schizophrenia or manic depression, a documen-
ted or suspected history of drug abuse and/or alcoholism, diabetes
mellitus and major abnormalities on brain MRI scans such as cerebral
infarction or tumour. Of the 32 patients with Parkinson’s disease,
14 were taking drugs for Parkinson’s disease (i.e. levodopa and/or
dopamine agonists), and they were asked not to take these drugs
for at least 5h before PET scanning.
Because we intended to conduct correlation analysis between the
ability to tell lies and resting regional glucose metabolism within
the group of patients, none of the control subjects who participated
in the neuropsychological assessments was included in the PET study.
However, even if correlation analysis within the group of patients
identiﬁed the speciﬁc regions responsible for disability to tell lies, this
would not prove that these ﬁndings were caused by the disease. To
draw a deﬁnite conclusion, we needed to demonstrate explicitly that
the regions identiﬁed in the correlation analysis were hypometabolic in
the patients relative to the normal controls, i.e. lesioned. Therefore, we
obtained PET data from another group consisting of 14 healthy parti-
cipants without psychiatric or neurological disease (seven women,
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MMSE score 29.1). There was no signiﬁcant difference in age, sex,
education and MMSE score between the patients and these healthy
participants (all P40.1). The PET data obtained from our sample of
32 patients were contrasted with those obtained from this normative
group, and a resulting mask image was used in the correlation analysis
in order to conﬁne our analysis to regions showing hypometabolism in
the Parkinson’s disease patients. All the PET images were obtained
with the same machine (see below).
After being given a detailed description of the study, written
informed consent was obtained from all participants in accordance
with guidelines approved by the Ethical Committee of Tohoku
University and the Declaration of Helsinki.
Standard neuropsychological tests
For all the patients and controls, in addition to the MMSE, a set of
standard neuropsychological tests was used to identify any explicit
cognitive deﬁcits. Attention was assessed by digit span and spatial
span subtests from the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R).
Memory function was assessed by a word recall task from the
Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (ADAS). Frontal lobe function
was assessed by verbal ﬂuency tasks, the trail-making test and com-
puterized versions of the Stroop task and the Go/No-go task.
In the computerized version of the Stroop task, the subjects were
required to name the colour of the ink in which single words were
printed, as each word was shown on the screen. Four ink colours
were used, and all the words in the test were the names of these
four colours. Therefore, trials were either congruent (colour and
word the same) or incongruent (colour and word different). Each stim-
ulus was presented for 2000ms, with 2000-ms interstimulus intervals.
The entire session consisted of 72 congruent and 24 incongruent
trials. The verbal response was recorded on a digital sound-recording
machine.
In the computerized version of the Go/No-go task, when a single
digit appeared with the illustration of a dog in the centre of the screen,
the subjects were required to read the digit aloud. When the number
appeared with the illustration of a cat, the subjects were required
to make no response. Each stimulus was displayed for 2000ms,
with 2000-ms interstimulus intervals. The entire session consisted of
72 Go trials and 24 No-go trials. The verbal response was recorded
on a digital sound-recording machine.
Table 1 Demographic and neuropsychological data (meanSD) of the Parkinson’s disease patients and controls
Variable Parkinson’s
disease patients
(n=32)
Controls (n=20) P-values
Demographics
Age 65.9 (6.7) 65.5 (4.8) 0.807
Sex (Female/Male) 19/13 11/9 0.756
Education 11.7 (2.1) 12.7 (2.4) 0.127
Duration of Parkinson’s disease 4.1 (4.6) – –
Levodopa equivalent dose (mg/day) 507.0 (825.6) – –
UPDRS part III (motor part)
a 18.1 (7.2) – –
Hoehn-Yahr stage (median/range) 2.5/1.0-3.0 – –
Cognitive function
MMSE 28.3 (1.7) 28.6 (1.1) 0.386
Digit span
Forward 5.7 (0.9) 5.6 (1.0) 0.693
Backward 4.1 (1.0) 4.8 (1.0) 0.035
Spatial span
Forward 5.7 (0.9) 5.6 (1.1) 0.546
Backward 5.0 (1.0) 4.9 (0.9) 0.588
ADAS word recall
Total score 19.3 (4.3) 21.3 (3.5) 0.089
Verbal ﬂuency
Category: animal 16.4 (5.3) 22.1 (5.8) 0.001
Syllables: ‘fu’, ‘a’, ‘ni’ 22.1 (8.2) 29.4 (8.7) 0.004
Trail-making test (time required)
b
Part B - Part A 83.0 (41.0) 59.1 (33.7) 0.035
Stroop task (accuracy)
Congruent 98.0 (11.0) 100.0 (0.0) 0.424
Incongruent 93.5 (14.9) 95.6 (8.8) 0.565
Go/No-go task (accuracy)
Go condition 99.9 (0.5) 100 (0) 0.184
No-go condition 99.6 (1.2) 99.6 (1.3) 0.942
Chi-square test was used for sex ratio, and t-test was used for the remaining variables.
a One patient was not assessed (n=31).
b Two patients could not complete this test (n=30).
ADAS=Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale.
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The experimental task consisted of an incidental study phase and a
recognition memory test phase during which the participants were
asked to tell the truth or a lie. First, we prepared colour photographs
of 51 common living things and 51 common inanimate objects. Three
of each type of these photographs were used as study buffers (three
at the beginning and three at the end of a study list) to exclude
primacy and recency effects on memory performance. The remaining
96 photographs were divided into two sets of equal numbers of ani-
mate and inanimate stimuli. One set was used as study items in the
study phase and as target items to be recognized later in the test
phase, and the other set was used as distracters in the test phase.
These two sets of photographs were matched for visual complexity,
familiarity and arousal (all P40.1), as rated by a separate group of 20
normal adults (10 women, 10 men; mean age 32.9 years), who did
not participate in the present experimental deception task. Each set of
48 stimuli was further divided into four lists of 12 stimuli each. Then,
four lists of photographs were compiled by combining 12 stimuli from
one set and 12 stimuli from another. These four lists consisting of 24
stimuli were again matched for visual complexity, familiarity and arou-
sal (all P40.1).
For the recognition memory phase, four actors (two men and two
women) were videotaped over 96 trials. In each scene (lasting 6s with
a 1-s interval between scenes), one of the actors randomly showed a
colour photograph of stimuli, while asking, in Japanese, ‘Did you see
this photograph?’ Each actor showed 24 stimuli, one by one in random-
ized order, except that the same actor did not appear sequentially.
During the study phase, the participants viewed 48 study stimuli and
six buffer stimuli, presented one at a time for 5s on a computer screen.
All the stimuli were presented visually in white squares on a black back-
ground. The interstimulus interval was 1s, during which cross-ﬁxation
was presented. To ensure that the participants paid attention to the
stimuli, they were instructed to indicate verbally whether each photo-
graph represented an animate or an inanimate object.
During the test phase (the main part of the present study), the
participants viewed a video consisting of 96 scenes. In total, 48 studied
and 48 unstudied stimuli were presented by the four actors. The par-
ticipants were asked to say whether each photograph was familiar (i.e.
‘I saw’) or not (i.e. ‘I didn’t see’) after the actor had asked the ques-
tion, ‘Did you see this photograph?’ In addition, participants were also
requested to tell the truth in response to three actors (Truth condition)
and to tell a lie in response to the remaining actor (Lie condition). We
used unequal stimulus classes (25% lie and 75% truth) on the
assumption that truthful responses are frequent and ordinary, whereas
deceptive responses should be infrequent and extraordinary. In fact,
previous studies of executive function, such as the Stroop effect, have
suggested that a lower proportion of incongruent trials (homologous
with deceptive responses in the present study) increases the cognitive
conﬂict associated with responding to the stimuli (Carter et al., 2000;
Swick and Jovanovic, 2002; Fellows and Farah, 2005). The actor to
whom a lie was to be told was counterbalanced across the
participants.
The experiment yielded four types of responses: true responses for
the studied items, true responses for the unstudied items, deceptive
responses for the studied items, and deceptive responses for the
unstudied items. In this study, collapsing across item type (i.e. studied
or unstudied items), the data were analysed for honest and deceptive
responses in the Parkinson’s disease patients and normal controls.
Mathematically, the effect of cognitive demand on deception was
expressed by a deception task index (i.e. the percent of correct
responses in the Truth condition minus that in the Lie condition).
The deception task index reﬂected the difﬁculty making deceptive
responses regardless of the participant’s basic recognition memory
performance, and was therefore used for correlation analyses.
To investigate the possibility that the Parkinson’s disease patients’
apparent impaired ability to lie was due to forgetting to which actor
they had to give deceptive responses, after the task was completed,
both the patients and the controls were asked whether or not they
had forgotten the target person they had to deceive throughout the
task. They were also presented with face photographs of the four
actors, and were asked to indicate the actor to whom they had
been instructed to tell a lie. Throughout the entire task session, all
the verbal responses made by the patients and the normal controls
were recorded on a digital sound-recording machine. These data were
subsequently used for the evaluation of performance accuracy and
error pattern.
PET data acquisition and voxel-based
analysis
After a fasting period of at least 5h, PET images were obtained using
185–218 MBq FDG. Dynamic PET scans were performed in three-
dimensional mode using a Siemens Biograph DUO PET scanner
(Siemens Medical System, Inc., USA). Subjects were scanned under
resting conditions with their eyes closed and ears unplugged. To min-
imize the effects of external stimuli during the FDG-uptake period of
1h, the subjects stayed in a quiet room wearing eye masks. In-plane
and axial resolutions of the scanner were 3.38mm and 3.38mm,
respectively. An attenuation correction was performed with a CT
scan. The data obtained were reconstructed using ordered subset
expectation maximization (OSEM) algorithms (16 subsets6 itera-
tions) with Gaussian ﬁlter with FWHM=2.0mm in 256256
matrix, pixel size of 1.331.33mm and a slice thickness of 2.0mm.
PET images and the values of arterial input function measurements
were converted to cerebral metabolic rate of glucose images according
to a model based on the autoradiographic technique (Phelps et al.,
1979). The interval between the neuropsychological tests and PET
scanning was 54 weeks.
The PET data were analysed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). All the PET images were normal-
ized to the FDG-template based on the MNI reference brain
(re-sampled voxel size 222mm
3). Then, all the images were
smoothed using an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 10mm to increase
the signal-to-noise ratio and to compensate for differences in gyral
anatomy between individuals. To reduce between-subject variation in
global metabolic rates, the count of each voxel was normalized to the
total count of the brain using proportional scaling.
The deception task indices were entered as covariates of interest in
the analysis of the Parkinson’s disease patients, with the aim of iden-
tifying regions showing decreased metabolism associated with low
performance. The threshold of signiﬁcance was set at P50.001 at
the voxel level (uncorrected), with a signiﬁcance of P50.05 at the
cluster level (corrected). To conﬁne our analysis to regions showing
hypometabolism in the patients relative to the normal participants,
the PET data obtained from our sample of 32 patients were contrasted
with those obtained from a group of 14 healthy participants (who did
not participate in the present experimental deception task), and a
resulting map with a liberal statistical threshold (P50.05, uncorrected)
was used for masking in the correlation analysis. In addition, possible
confounding effects of age and sex (i.e. biological factors) were con-
trolled by entering these variables into the model. Then, in separate
analyses, the duration of Parkinson’s disease, the effect of medication
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part), and the scores of MMSE—all of which are possible confounding
factors for regional metabolism—were controlled by entering these
variables into the model.
Results
Standard neuropsychological tests
Table 1 lists the results of the standard neuropsychological tests
and statistical comparison between the Parkinson’s disease
patients and normal controls, as well as the demographic data.
The t-test was used to assess the statistical signiﬁcance for all
the variables between the two groups except for sex ratio, for
which the chi-squared test was used. The patients performed sig-
niﬁcantly worse than the controls on the digit span test (back-
ward), the verbal ﬂuency task related to syllables and category,
and the trail-making test, indicating that Parkinson’s disease
patients had executive dysfunction. The patients also performed
marginally worse than controls on the ADAS word recall test. No
signiﬁcant difference was found between the two groups in the
Stroop task and the Go/No-go task, possibly due to ceiling effects
resulting from the level of difﬁculty of these tests, which were
speciﬁcally designed for the present study. Also, no difference
was found between the patients and controls in the digit span
test (forward) and the spatial span tests (forward and backward).
The experimental deception task
During the encoding phase, animate–inanimate judgment was vir-
tually 100% correct for all the Parkinson’s disease patients and
normal controls, indicating that the participants paid sufﬁcient
attention to the stimuli.
For the retrieval session, collapsing across item type (i.e. studied
and unstudied items), the data related to mean accuracy were
analysed. For the patients, mean accuracies were 80.4%
(SD=9.5) for the Truth condition and 71.5% (SD=17.1) for the
Lie condition. For the normal controls, mean accuracies were
84.8% (SD=5.1) for the Truth condition and 83.8% (SD=11.9)
for the Lie condition. A 2 (Group: Parkinson’s disease patients,
normal controls)2 (Task: Truth, Lie) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of Group
[F(1,50)=7.25, P=0.010], a signiﬁcant main effect of Task
[F(1,50)=9.22, P=0.004] and a signiﬁcant GroupTask interac-
tion [F(1,50)=5.77, P=0.020]. Post hoc tests revealed the reason
for this interaction: the Parkinson’s disease patients showed a
decreased number of correct responses in the Lie condition relative
to the Truth condition [t(31)=4.06, P=0.0003], whereas the con-
trols showed no difference in scores between these two conditions
[t(19)=0.47, P=0.641]. The results are shown in Fig. 1.
Although one patient stated in the middle of the task that she
was not sure of the target person to deceive, the remaining
patients stated with conﬁdence after the experiment that they
could easily and immediately recognize the target person
to deceive throughout the task. However, in the forced-choice
recognition test, all the patients, including the patient who
had expressed uncertainty, correctly chose the target person
to deceive. This indicates that the patients’ impaired ability to lie
cannot be attributable to forgetting who to deceive. In addition,
analysis of error pattern during the Lie condition in Parkinson’s
disease patients revealed that they often made errors by telling
the truth (91.8% of all the error responses, but note that this rate
includes errors for basic recognition memory performance). More
importantly, there were few errors of no response (0.9%) and
dual response (7.3%). The extremely low rate for these types of
errors indicates that the patients understood sufﬁciently and per-
formed the task without any difﬁculty resulting from motor dys-
function. Together, these ﬁndings support the view that the
patients’ deteriorated performance was deﬁnitely derived from a
failure to inhibit true responses and make deceptive responses.
To clarify the effect of set shifting on the deception task in
Parkinson’s disease patients, we also compared the accuracy of
Truth trials that were preceded by Lie trials with that of the
remaining Truth trials that were not preceded by Lie trials in
Parkinson’s disease patients. If the set-shifting deﬁcits affected
the deception task performance, the patients should show worse
performance for the Truth trials preceded by Lie trials than for
those not preceded by Lie trials. Mean accuracies were 79.1%
(SD=10.3) for the Truth trials preceded by Lie trials and 81.1%
(SD=10.3) for the Truth trials not preceded by Lie trials. We
found that there was no signiﬁcant difference between the two
types of trials [t(31)=1.32, P=0.198], suggesting that there was
no effect of set-shifting deﬁcits on the deception task.
We further conducted correlation analyses to investigate the
relationship between performance of the deception task and cog-
nitive dysfunctions detected by the standard neuropsychological
tests in Parkinson’s disease patients (i.e. the backward digit span
task, the verbal ﬂuency for category and syllables, and the trail-
making test). The deception task index was signiﬁcantly correlated
with the performance of verbal ﬂuency for syllables (r=–0.429,
P=0.013) and with the performance (i.e. time required) of the
trail-making test (n=30, because of missing data for two patients,
r=0.372, P=0.042). We also found a trend between the decep-
tion task index and the performance of verbal ﬂuency for cate-
gory (r=–0.303, P=0.092). However, there was no signiﬁcant
correlation between the deception task index and performance
of the digit span (backward) task (r=–0.245, P=0.179).
Figure 1 Proportion of correct honest (Truth condition) and
deceptive (Lie condition) responses during the deception task in
the Parkinson’s disease patients and normal controls. Error bars
represent standard error. PD=Parkinson’s disease.
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The results are shown in Table 2 and Fig. 2. Signiﬁcant negative
correlations were found between the deception task index and the
metabolic rates of the right anterior prefrontal cortex (BA10) and
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA10/46). Note that the
results were masked with the contrast of normal controls versus
Parkinson’s disease patients, indicating that these two regions
were found within the regions showing hypometabolism in the
patients relative to the normal participants. Furthermore, the con-
founding effects of age and sex were also controlled. If the effect
of disease duration was further controlled, the results remained
virtually unchanged, suggesting that they are not affected by
duration of the disease. Similarly, if the effect of medication (i.e.
levodopa equivalent dose) was further controlled, the results again
remained virtually unchanged, suggesting that they are not
affected by Parkinson’s disease medication. If the UPDRS scores
part III (motor part) were further controlled (n=31, because of
missing data for one patient), the results again remained virtually
unchanged, suggesting that they are not affected by severity of
motor symptoms. If the MMSE scores were further controlled, the
results for these two regions remained signiﬁcant (P50.001 at the
voxel level, uncorrected, but with smaller cluster size; 102 voxels
for the right anterior prefrontal cortex and 23 voxels for the left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), suggesting that the main ﬁndings
of this study cannot simply be explained in terms of the severity of
general cognitive deﬁcits.
Discussion
In the present study, we tested our hypothesis that patients with
Parkinson’s disease have difﬁculty making deceptive responses due
to dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex. As predicted, the patients
could not successfully make deceptive responses compared
with the healthy controls. Furthermore, consistent with previous
neuroimaging studies with healthy individuals that have indicated
an association between deception and the prefrontal cortex, FDG-
PET imaging revealed that the patients’ failure in the deception
task was signiﬁcantly correlated with hypometabolism in the
prefrontal cortex, regardless of age, sex and other possible
confounding factors. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst neuro-
psychological evidence that dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex
is involved in the inability to inhibit true responses and produce
deceptive responses in Parkinson’s disease patients.
The results of the present study raise two important points. First,
certain personality traits of Parkinson’s disease patients (Menza,
2000; Ishihara and Brayne, 2006) might be at least partly
explained by neuropsychological deﬁcits. In other words, the cog-
nitive deﬁcits may have an inﬂuence on ostensible personality
traits in Parkinson’s disease patients. More speciﬁcally, the present
results indicate that honesty in Parkinson’s disease patients might
result from impairment of the executive functions necessary for
the processes involved in telling lies. Indeed, the patients showed
worse performance in the verbal ﬂuency task and the trail-making
test (generally used as measures of executive function) compared
with the normal controls. Although these tests are different from
the deception task in terms of how the subjects respond
(e.g. open-ended responses in verbal ﬂuency and forced-choice
responses in the deception task), and therefore are not likely to
have direct impact on deception task performance, there is still a
possibility that these tests partially share the cognitive and neural
mechanisms of deception in terms of higher-order cognitive
processes including executive function. In line with this idea,
these task performances were signiﬁcantly correlated with decep-
tion task performance. Future studies using an approach similar to
that of the present study might further clarify the relationships
between cognitive dysfunction and characteristic personality and
behavioural traits in Parkinson’s disease patients.
Second, the results reveal a direct association between a cogni-
tive control system subserving deception and function of the pre-
frontal cortex. It is known that brain imaging of healthy people
Table 2 Brain regions showing a signiﬁcant correlation between deception task performance and regional metabolism
Regions (Brodmann’s Area) Coordinates Z-value Cluster size
xy z
Controlling for age and sex (shown in Figure 2)
Right anterior prefrontal cortex (10) 10 66 6 4.03 426
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (10/46) 32 58 10 3.99 261
Controlling for age, sex and disease duration
Right anterior prefrontal cortex (10) 8 68 6 4.00 396
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (10/46) 32 58 10 3.84 198
Controlling for age, sex and levodopa equivalent dose
Right anterior prefrontal cortex (10) 8 68 6 4.14 455
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (10/46) 18 58 12 3.91 225
Controlling for age, sex and UPDRS motor scores
Right anterior prefrontal cortex (10) 10 68 6 4.06 588
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (10/46) 32 60 10 3.91 214
Controlling for age, sex and MMSE scores
Right anterior prefrontal cortex (10) 8 66 4 3.56 102
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (10/46) 32 58 10 3.40 23
The results were masked with the contrast of normal controls versus Parkinson’s disease patients.
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essary for the performance of a speciﬁc cognitive task (Frackowiak
et al., 1997). That is, some activation in functional brain imaging
studies may reﬂect brain activity that is not essential for the func-
tion of interest. Therefore, direct evidence is derived from loss-of-
function studies. In the present study, we revealed that the right
anterior prefrontal cortex and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
which have been activated during deception in a number of care-
fully designed imaging studies (for reviews, see Spence et al.,
2004; Sip et al., 2008; Christ et al., in press), are associated
with making deceptive responses. In line with our results, a
recent study using transcranial direct current stimulation provided
evidence that manipulation of functions in the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex altered the speed and efﬁciency of deceptive
responses (Priori et al., 2008). Furthermore, the association
between deception and the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in
the present study is highly consistent with the ﬁndings of a series
of neuroimaging studies that we have conducted with healthy
individuals (Abe et al., 2006, 2007, 2008).
Based on the previous ﬁndings and the present results, we
propose that the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the region
implicated in a wide range of higher-level cognitive operations
such as working memory (D’Esposito et al., 1995; Salmon et al.,
1996) and resolution of response conﬂict (MacDonald et al.,
2000; Badre and Wagner, 2004), plays a pivotal role in telling
lies. The right anterior prefrontal cortex is also likely to play
a critical role in integrating the multiple cognitive processes
(Ramnani and Owen, 2004) in deception. One might think
that set-shifting deﬁcits, one of the well-known cognitive deﬁcits
in Parkinson’s disease (Ravizza and Ciranni, 2002; Monchi et al.,
2004; Moustafa et al., 2008; Nagano-Saito et al., 2008), affect
the results. However, our analysis of set-shifting effect on the
response accuracy in Truth trials did not support this interpreta-
tion. We believe that our task does not simply measure set
shifting, and that dysfunction of the left dorsolateral and right
anterior prefrontal cortices speciﬁcally prevents Parkinson’s
disease patients from inhibiting true responses and producing
deceptive responses.
Figure 2 (A) Brain regions showing hypometabolism in the Parkinson’s disease patients compared with the normal controls. Note that
the statistical threshold was relatively liberal in this group comparison (P50.05, uncorrected), since this analysis was done only for
generating a mask image included in the cognitive-metabolic correlation analysis within the group of Parkinson’s disease patients. The
regions are displayed on a surface-rendered standard brain. (B) Brain regions showing a signiﬁcant correlation between performance in
the deception task and regional cerebral glucose metabolism in the Parkinson’s disease patients (P50.001, uncorrected). Note that the
results were masked with the above contrast of the normal controls versus the Parkinson’s disease patients to conﬁne our analysis to
the regions showing hypometabolism in the Parkinson’s disease patients. The possible confounding effects of age and sex were also
controlled. (C) Scatter plots of the correlations between the deception task indices and the FDG-uptake values in the right anterior
prefrontal cortex (r=–0.719, P50.001) and the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (r=–0.709, P50.001). FDG=ﬂuorodeoxyglucose;
PD=Parkinson’s disease.
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possibly disrupting deceptive behaviour, is derived from the neu-
ropathological changes observed in Parkinson’s disease patients.
One possibility is that prefrontal hypometabolism in Parkinson’s
disease patients results from degeneration of the substantia nigra
pars compacta with subsequent depletion of dopamine in the
striatum. A recent study suggests that the dorsolateral prefrontal
circuit consisting of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, caudate
nucleus, globus pallidus, substantia nigra, and thalamus
(Cummings, 1993; McPherson and Cummings, 2002) is speciﬁcally
associated with executive dysfunction in Parkinson’s disease
patients (Zgaljardic et al., 2006). Alternatively, the executive dys-
function may reﬂect a functional disturbance of the frontal cortex
itself caused by locally impaired mesocortical dopaminergic trans-
mission (Mattay et al., 2002). Although these two models are not
mutually exclusive, there is controversy in the recent literature in
that some researchers have argued that both the nigrostriatal and
mesocortical pathways are disrupted in Parkinson’s disease
(Monchi et al., 2007), whereas others have shown impaired
nigrostriatal dopaminergic function with preserved mesocortical
dopaminergic transmission in early Parkinson’s disease
(Sawamoto et al., 2008). As for dopaminergic transmission, a
study in which the ‘on’ and ‘off’ medication states are directly
compared would also be useful. We can predict that dopaminergic
medication would have a beneﬁcial effect on the regions affected
by depletion of dopamine, such as the caudate nucleus and
thereby its connections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and
that the ability to make deceptive responses would improve in
Parkinson’s disease patients. In fact, some previous studies have
reported the beneﬁcial effects of levodopa on cognitive perfor-
mance, although it should be noted that the effects depend on
the nature of the task (Gotham et al., 1988; Cools et al., 2001;
Lewis et al., 2005).
In conclusion, our results provide new evidence that damage to
the prefrontal cortex disrupts the processes involved in making
deceptive responses in Parkinson’s disease patients. It appears
that the ‘honesty’ of patients is caused by an impaired ability to
deceive others that results from brain dysfunction caused by the
disease. However, there are some limitations of the present study
that should be borne in mind for future studies. First, the present
study examined only the processes associated with executive con-
trol during deception. The participants were instructed to tell a lie,
which cannot be viewed as being the same as deception in real
life. The neural bases of genuine deception or immoral lying
should be investigated further in both healthy individuals and
brain-damaged patients. Second, it remains a possibility that the
association between difﬁculty deceiving others and prefrontal dys-
function may not be speciﬁc to Parkinson’s disease patients, and
further studies are needed to examine whether patients with other
neurological disorders affecting the prefrontal cortex show similar
deﬁcits (see Spence and Kaylor-Hughes, 2008). Third, the present
study investigated only patients with mild Parkinson’s disease of
short duration. Whether our claim is true of patients in general is
an important issue to be pursued. Finally, it is also important to
determine how (and when) the brain pathology derived from
Parkinson’s disease causes speciﬁc personality traits together
with explicit cognitive deﬁcits. A longitudinal assessment with
detailed neuropsychological assessment and multimodal neuroima-
ging in Parkinson’s disease patients is required.
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